Heido Vitsur

It goes without saying that like in any other state also in our state one can find ineffectiveness. I would distinguish here two kind of ineffectiveness. Firstly a technical, organisational ineffectiveness and secondly ineffectiveness of essence, of principle.  It is also true that the biggest originator of ineffectiveness is the boarders of administrative areas and action spheres.

But due to the problems and complicity of interdependence characteristic to state any country is more sophisticated organisation than any enterprise. Hence there are limits to use of some solutions which technically could be possible.

To argue that ineffectiveness is acceptable in Estonia would be wrong.  In close future Estonia in cooperation with OECD should get ready the audit of our states activities; also a year ago on the conference of ‘Estonia after Euro’, which was organised by the Estonian Cooperation Assembly and Development Fund, Jüri Raidla called for conducting state audit of Estonia again for the benefit of effectiveness of the state. The team has started the work. Hence there are at least two sources outside Estonian administration preparing overview of the problems of our state and proposals for improvements and corrections.

It will not be easy. To connect or rearrange and to make more effective the net of institutions or services is never simple or cheap. Unfortunately we do not know well enough still how much one or another rearrangement of the past did cost us, the taxpayers. Let it be such simple things like moving Ministry of Education and Science to Tartu or uniting Estonian Radio and Estonian Television. And the expenses are the simple side. More important would be to know did the joining bring synergy, how much potential of development was created and what were the losses.

Such analysis and calculations are very sensitive, difficult and laborious and we have no tradition of doing or publicising them.

Hence this is one possible answer to the question why there seems to be present acceptance of situation at hand. Firstly the gut-feeling of experienced high executives says that nice reform proposals are in reality really as nice. Secondly the experience also proves that rearranging costs more than the most pessimistic prognoses were and take also more time as a rule.

Let’s take the digital prescription as an example. Today the talk of it has died down, system most probably is working, but how much problems did it create not so long ago. Regrettably we do not have deep analysis of the elaboration and application of this relatively restricted project. But it would be necessary for the benefit of the initiators and doers of new projects.

But at the same time it is probable that now it is more difficult to find someone from decision-makers who would want to take risk with more complicated reforms than that. Especially if the topic crosses the interdepartmental borders.

Nevertheless I am convinced that instituting technical improvements in the household of Estonian state has gone with dashing speed, so we have nothing to be ashamed of.  I am sure that when the time is right the barriers between departments will be torn down.

Heido Vitsur: The following thoughts have been inspired by the questions asked by the newspaper "Sirp"

Probably yes and for quite a few reasons.

Firstly, the Occident has ceased to be the principal (single) global development engine.

Secondly, the lifestyle cultivated in the Occident is unsustainable from both demographic and economic aspects. We have lost our instinct of self-preservation and are living in the moment without caring about the future. We (i.e. Europeans and nations of European origin) have become the biggest squanderers and increasingly less competitive workers. Consequently,  the Occident will find competing for limited global resources increasingly more complicated with every decade, and the pressure originating from more successful and growing competitors compels the Occident to tighten its belt now and again.

The last century formally marked the end of the period of colonialism. Can one anticipate that in this century numerous non-Western cultures will advance towards a more dignified and tension-free self-rule? Currently all forecasts point to this century turning out to be China's century.  

The first quarter of the century will still be led by the United States, the EU and China, but the other half will already be driven by China, the United States and India. It is possible that during the next few decades some Latin-American countries, Indonesia, Turkey and a few Arab states will break free from colonial or semi-colonial history.

 But most former colonies are facing a future that is darker than ever before. The gap between these countries and developed countries has not narrowed during the past decades, it has broadened instead.

It is difficult to predict how tension-free and dignified that progressing self-rule will be. After all, potential threats are lurking on both sides. The Occident is unwilling to give up its positions for nothing while not all emerging countries are likely to resist the opportunity to demonstrate their new strength, should favourable circumstances appear. Hence it is wiser to expect that fundamental changes in economic, demographic and scientific-technological development result in abundant tensions and probably also in undignified actions instead.

Let us contemplate on the fact that the past ten years, which have been economically very successful for both parties, have neither alleviated tensions between Estonia and Russia nor made relations between the countries more dignified. And yet there are not many developing countries in the world that did not experience major trouble with some of the leading powers during the past century. The conduct of the Occident towards all the emerging economic super-powers has actually been rather wretched in not so distant past.

How dangerous is Russia to Estonia today?

How dangerous to the West? Today Russia is back in global politics and it is understandable that the country is also trying to demonstrate it. Those who were just ten years ago kindling hopes of the carcass of the Soviet Union crumbling terminally into defenceless fragments do not find such a development appealing, but facts remain facts.

The Western attitude towards Russia's development is diverse, depending on respective interests. There are countries that mainly see growing opportunities in a stronger Russia while there are others who see better opportunities in the collapsing and defenceless Russia. But even the latter do not feel such an antagonism or opposition as during the Cold War or even during perestroika, there are merely certain economic and geopolitical conflicts of interest. Russia and Europe are progressively transforming into Siamese twins that have different characters and do not get along very well, but are inseparable and increasingly dependent on each other. Europe is not afraid of Russia, and why should it be? During the last two hundred years Russia has actually done nothing in Europe - except the coup d'état in 1917 and the break-up of the Soviet Union - without first co-ordinating its actions with the major European powers, even when the country was at the peak of its might.

The West is well aware that regardless of the current reinforcement of positions Russia will never restore the might it enjoyed under Alexander I or Stalin. Besides, both Russia and the West realise that in the imminent global fight for positions they are both in need of allies and the most important global 'demarcation lines' in the decades to come will evidently be drawn in other places than between Europe and Russia.

However, Russia is undoubtedly dangerous to Estonia. Here I do not mean a military threat, rather the fact that Russia has hypnotised us to the extent that, as a result, we see the world in a way it is actually not and, therefore, we completely fail to see ourselves from another side. We cannot even comprehend such a simple thing that our hypersensitivity towards Russia does not harm it, but helps it, instead, through broadening the divide in Europe and contributing to increased bilateral relations between Russia and EU Member States. It reduces Estonia's attractiveness for Western investors and thus restricts Estonia's options.

After all, Estonia today is not threatened by Russian tanks, rather by the vulnerability of our economy and the need for foreign investments.